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Speaker 1:
On Tuesday, July 22, 2008, the Panther Fire

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started on the Klamath National Forest in
Northern California.

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On July 23, the fire was discovered at an
estimated size of 50 acres.

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Initial tech efforts to contain the fire were
unsuccessful.

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The next day, command of the fire was transferred
from an incident commander type four, to an

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incident commander type three and a trainee.

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Even with more resources, efforts to contain
the fire and establish an anchor point were

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unsuccessful.

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The fire had grown to an estimated 170 acres.

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On Friday, increased fire activity hampered
efforts to establish an anchor point once

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again.

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It was decided command of the Panther Fire
would be transferred to the Siskiyou complex.

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On Saturday, July 26, the fire crept downhill
overnight and became established on both sides

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of the unnamed drainage on the east side of
the fire.

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The inner agency hotshot crew and the type
two initial tack crew were assigned to start

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construction of indirect hand line on the
ridge from drop point 16 to the high knob

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on the west side of the fire.

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Two division group supervisors, division one
and two, from the Siskiyou complex, were assigned

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to scout the fire and prepare a strategy for
the following day when the transfer of command

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was to take place.

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At 10:00 AM in the morning, division one and
two arrived at drop point 16 and received

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a briefing from the ICT3 trainee.

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At 11:30 AM, during the briefing, the fire
activity increased, causing the hot shot and

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initial tack crews to disengage the fire and
return to drop point 16.

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Division one and two departed the drop point
at noon to scout road 14 and 05.

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An hour later, the crews reengaged and went
back to constructing indirect hand line on

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the ridge.

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At 14:00, division one and two returned to
the drop point and left to scout on foot the

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hand line construction.

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Between 14:30 and 14:45, a report from the
initial tack crew lookout indicated the fire

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activity was increasing.

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Around 15:00, division one and two were with
the hotshot crew in the saddle.

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The hot shot crew superintendent informed
division one and two that the safety zone

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that was near the high knob on the west side
of the fire was about 200 to 300 yards up

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the ridge.

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Division one and two decided to continue west
toward the safety zone.

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A smoke jumper crew and various overhead were
already staged at the safety zone.

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The hot shot crew used their escape route
down the north slope of the ridge to road

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14-N-O-5, and then continued all the way back
to the drop point.

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At 15:10, division one and two progressed
up the ridge towards the safety zone.

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The fire activity continued to increase.

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Not knowing exactly how much further the safety
zone was, division two said, "Up or down?"

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They both reversed direction and attempted
to escape down toward the saddle.

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They were cut off by fire that crossed the
saddle.

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They reversed direction again, moving back
up to the safety zone.

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With the fire activity increasing more, division
one found a small opening in the brush and

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said, "We need to deploy."

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Both division one and two started to deploy
their fire shelters.

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Division two further looked over his surroundings
and felt the area was not a suitable deployment

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site.

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Division two explained to division one that
the shelters wouldn't work at that site and

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they needed to go down the hill.

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Division one did not respond and continued
to deploy his fire shelter.

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Division two balled up his shelter under his
arm and ran down the hill.

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After his cross country escape through heavy
downfall, brush and timber, division two made

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it to road 14-N-O-5, at around 15:20, where
he met the ICT3 trainee.

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The trainee contacted air attack to conduct
water bucket drops to aid in the search and

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rescue of division one.

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At 16:50, the smoke jumper crew located division
one, deceased inside his fire shelter.

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The fire was too hot and the duration of heat
was too long for the fire shelter to provide

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sufficient protection for division one.